must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny. Ante, at 31, n.16 (quoting Adarand, 515 U. S., at 227). Laws arise from a culture and vice versa. This working backward to achieve a particular type of racial balance, rather than working forward from some demonstration of the level of diversity that provides the purported benefits, is a fatal flaw under our existing precedent. The pluralitys claim that Seattle was never segregated by law is simply not accurate. If those students were considered for a whole range of their talents and school needs with race as just one consideration, Grutter would have some application. The statistics cited in Appendix A to the dissent are not to the contrary. 2d 753, 756, and nn. It initially assigned each student to his or her neighborhood school, but it permitted each student freely to transfer between elementary schools within each cluster provided that the transferring student (a) was black if transferring from a predominantly black school to a predominantly white school, or (b) was white if transferring from a predominantly white school to a predominantly black school. in No. Id., at 338, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 156 L. Ed. And, in any event, the histories of Seattle and Louisville make clear that this distinctionbetween court-ordered and voluntary desegregationseeks a line that sensibly cannot be drawn. The districts argue that other factors, such as student preferences, affect assignment decisions under their plans, but under each plan when race comes into play, it is decisive by itself. At a particular school either whites or non-whites could be favored for admission depending on which race would bring the racial balance closer to the goal. 1, this Court struck down a state referendum that effectively barred implementation of Seattles desegregation plan and burden[ed] all future attempts to integrate Washington schools in districts throughout the State. Id., at 462463, 483. They constitute but one part of plans that depend primarily upon other, nonracial elements. Such deference is fundamentally at odds with our equal protection jurisprudence. 1, p. 7 (We have one fundamental contention which we will seek to develop in the course of this argument, and that contention is that no State has any authority under the equal-protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to use race as a factor in affording educational opportunities among its citizens); Tr. at 12. Some schools are more popular than others. The Constitution generally prohibits government race-based decisionmaking, but this Court has authorized the use of race-based measures for remedial purposes in two narrowly defined circumstances. To this day, misconceptions abound about whether voluntary school desegregation is constitutionally permitted in the United States. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 637 (1943) (The Fourteenth Amendment protects the citizen against the State itself and all of its creaturesBoards of Education not excepted). 5 Memorandum Opinion and Order, Haycraft v. Board of Ed. In support, the dissent unquestioningly cites certain social science research to support propositions that are hotly disputed among social scientists. Courts even began to tamp down on local, voluntary busing programs. . See generally N. Thompson & C. Marr, Building for Learning: Seattle Public Schools Histories, 18622000 (2002). Student Choice and Project Renaissance, 1991 to 1996. In Seattle, the plaintiffs alleged that school segregation unconstitutionally reflected not only generalized societal discrimination and residential housing patterns, but also school board policies and actions that had helped to create, maintain, and aggravate racial segregation. 05908, p. 38a. And it is for them to debate how best to educate the Nations children and how best to administer Americas schools to achieve that aim. App. 05908, at 224a225a, 253a259a, 307a. ), appeal dismd for want of a substantial federal question, 484 U. S. 804 (1987). See Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294, 300 (1955) (Brown II) (At stake is the personal interest of the plaintiffs in admission to public schools on a nondiscriminatory basis (emphasis added)). Fifty years of experience since Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954), should teach us that the problem before us defies so easy a solution. I concur in the Chief Justices opinion so holding. 1 that the racial classifications used by school districts in Seattle and Louisville to create diverse schools were unconstitutional. 1, 149 Wash. 2d 660, 72 P.3d 151 (2003); 137 F.Supp. Aside from constitutionally compelled remediation in schools, this Court has permitted government units to remedy prior racial discrimination only in narrow circumstances. One commentator, reviewing dozens of studies of the educational benefits of desegregated schooling, found that the studies have provided remarkably consistent results, showing that: (1) black students educational achievement is improved in integrated schools as compared to racially isolated schools, (2) black students educational achievement is improved in integrated classes, and (3) the earlier that black students are removed from racial isolation, the better their educational outcomes. The statement by Justice Harlan that [o]ur Constitution is color-blind was most certainly justified in the context of his dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, 559 (1896). JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION etal. If an educational interest that combines these three elements is not compelling, what is? The District Court also adopted a complex desegregation plan designed to achieve the orders targets. The dissent attempts to buttress the integration interest by claiming that it follows a fortiori from the interest this Court recognized as compelling in Grutter. What has happened to stare decisis? 693, 227 N.E.2d 729. Thus, the dissent argues that [e]ach plan embodies the results of local experience and community consultation. Post, at 47. See 426 F. 3d 1162, 11931196 (CA9 2005) (Kozinski, J., concurring); Comfort v. Lynn School Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 2729 (CA1 2005) (Boudin, C.J., concurring). The Seattle Board Statement Reaffirming Diversity Rationale speaks of the inherent educational value in [p]roviding students the opportunity to attend schools with diverse student enrollment, App. Because equal protection on the basis of race is at issue, the applicable standard of review to be applied in this case is strict scrutiny, as both parties agree, and as is well established in the Courts prior case law. After assignment, students at all grade levels are permitted to apply to transfer between nonmagnet schools in the district. 05908, at 137a139a. The histories also indicate the complexity of the tasks and the practical difficulties that local school boards face when they seek to achieve greater racial integration. With this factual background in mind, I turn to the legal question: Does the United States Constitution prohibit these school boards from using race-conscious criteria in the limited ways at issue here? 1, 2, and 4 p.65 (That the Constitution is color blind is our dedicated belief); Brief for Appellants in Brown v. Board of Education, O.T. 1952, No. Supra, at 1920. In Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No.1 (2007), the Supreme Court ruled that O public school policies that assigned students to a school on the basis of race were constitutional. Ibid. And what of laws concern to diminish and peacefully settle conflict among the Nations people? That initial 1956 plan proved ineffective. As the Court explained, [t]he importance of this individualized consideration in the context of a race-conscious admissions program is paramount. Ibid. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. Cf. Ante, at 6; ante, at 1516 (opinion of the Court). The Court has allowed school districts to remedy their prior de jure segregation by classifying individual students based on their race. The state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or public contracting. Wash. Rev. Citizens Against Mandatory Bussing v. Brooks, 80 Wash. 2d 121, 128129, 492 P.2d 536, 541542 (1972) (en banc), overruled on other grounds, Cole v. Webster, 103 Wash. 2d 280, 692 P.2d 799 (1984) (en banc); School Comm. in No. Franklin was integration positive because its nonwhite enrollment the previous school year was greater than 69 percent; 89 more white students were assigned to Franklin by operation of the racial tiebreaker in the 20002001 school year than otherwise would have been. Accordingly, these plans are simply one more variation on the government race-based decisionmaking we have consistently held must be subjected to strict scrutiny. That school was founded in 1990 as part of the school boards effort to increase academic achievement.[Footnote 12] See African American Academy History, online at http://www. Reply Brief for Petitioner in No. Context matters when reviewing race-based governmental action under the Equal Protection Clause. Thus, only by ignoring Grutters reasoning can the dissent claim that recognizing a compelling interest in these cases is an a fortiori application of Grutter. 1, 426 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. See Freeman, 503 U. S., at 496; Jenkins, 515 U. S., at 118 (Thomas, J., concurring). The Court in Grutter expressly articulated key limitations on its holdingdefining a specific type of broad-based diversity and noting the unique context of higher educationbut these limitations were largely disregarded by the lower courts in extending Grutter to uphold race-based assignments in elementary and secondary schools. 2, p. 76 ([A] State has power to establish a school system which is capable of efficient administration, taking into account local problems and conditions). To McDaniel? 2d 854 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part [*2761] and concurring in judgment), "Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. Which of the following statements offers the most accurate comparison between this case and the decision in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (1954)? Navigating around that inconvenient authority, the dissent argues that the racial balancing in these plans is not an end in itself but is instead intended to teac[h] children to engage in the kind of cooperation among Americans of all races that is necessary to make a land of three hundred million people one Nation. Post, at 3940. And it adjusted its alphabet-based system for grouping and busing students. Will Louisville and all similar school districts have to return to systems like Louisvilles initial 1956 plan, which did not consider race at all? [Footnote 19] See ibid. Achieving racially balanced school districts does not amount to a compelling government interest that satisfies strict scrutiny. Initial plans were implemented in Mobile, Alabama and Mecklenburg County, North Carolina, and in a number of other southern districts in the face of total racial segregation. Both Brown V. Board of Education and parents involved in Community Schools v. Seattle presented their case on grounds of 'Equal Protection' laws of the 14th Amendment. The school district met its percentage goals by assigning to the new mixed school an appropriate number of black housing blocks and white housing blocks. Numerous state and federal courts explicitly relied upon Swanns guidance for decades to follow. ; see also post, at 61. In Grutter, in contrast, the consideration of race was viewed as indispensable in more than tripling minority representation at the law school there at issue. This means that the government must identify a compelling interest and show that it has used a narrowly tailored means to further it. For the dissent, in contrast, individualized scrutiny is simply beside the point. Post, at 55. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit, No. in No. Again, this approach to racial classifications is fundamentally at odds with our precedent, which makes clear that the Equal Protection Clause protect[s] persons, not groups, Adarand, 515 U. S., at 227 (emphasis in original). Most white families live north of the downtown area where four high schools Ballard, Ingraham, Nathan Hale, and Roosevelt are located. The compelling interest at issue here, then, includes an effort to eradicate the remnants, not of general societal discrimination, ante, at 23 (plurality opinion), but of primary and secondary school segregation, see supra, at 7, 14; it includes an effort to create school environments that provide better educational opportunities for all children; it includes an effort to help create citizens better prepared to know, to understand, and to work with people of all races and backgrounds, thereby furthering the kind of democratic government our Constitution foresees. Indeed, the race-conscious ranges at issue in these cases often have no effect, either because the particular school is not oversubscribed in the year in question, or because the racial makeup of the school falls within the broad range, or because the student is a transfer applicant or has a sibling at the school. Id. Louisvilles plan was created and initially adopted when a compulsory district court order was in place. Sch. Compare ante, at 39 (It was not the inequality of the facilities but the fact of legally separating children on the basis of race on which the Court relied to find a constitutional violation in 1954), with Juris. In addition to these defects, the democratic element of the integration interest fails on the dissents own terms. . This Court in Adarand added that such classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests. Ibid. The statute establishing MSAP permits granting federal grants to magnet programs that seek to decrease minority group isolation. 20 U.S.C. De jure? Compare Green v. School Bd. Further, for all the lower court cases Justice Breyer cites as evidence of the prevailing legal assumption embodied by Swann, very few are pertinent. Although the matter was the subject of disagreement on the Court, see id., at 346347 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id., at 382383 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); id., at 388392 (Kennedy, J., dissenting), the majority concluded that the law school did not count back from its applicant pool to arrive at the meaningful number it regarded as necessary to diversify its student body. The complaint charged that the school board had brought about this segregated system in part by mak[ing] and enforc[ing] certain rules and regulations, in part by drawing . For example, one study documented that black and white students in desegregated schools are less racially prejudiced than those in segregated schools, and that interracial contact in desegregated schools leads to an increase in interracial sociability and friendship. Hallinan 745. Even in the context of mandatory desegregation, we have stressed that racial proportionality is not required, see Milliken, 433 U. S., at 280, n. 14 ([A desegregation] order contemplating the substantive constitutional right [to a] particular degree of racial balance or mixing is infirm as a matter of law (internal quotation marks omitted)); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. If we are to insist upon unanimity in the social science literature before finding a compelling interest, we might never find one. The 50/50 hypothetical has no support in the record here; it is conjured from the imagination. It is possible that schools will be able to extend these race-conscious programs to school sports teams, club memberships, classroom assignments, and so on. Strict scrutiny applies to any government classification based on race. Establishing a strong basis in evidence requires proper findings regarding the extent of the government units past racial discrimination. It is this part that went before the US Supreme Court as the other two cases were not appealed by JCPS. NO. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 373374 (1886). The dissent does not explain how its recognition of an interest in teaching racial understanding and cooperation here is consistent with the Courts rejection of a similar interest in Wygant. Brief for Petitioner at 79. PICS did not respond to this argument in either of its reply briefs. This plan is in place as of 2017. It then created a mixed student body by assigning to those schools students who would otherwise attend predominantly white, or predominantly black, schools elsewhere. They asked the court to dissolve the desegregation order and to hold the use of magnet school racial guidelines unconstitutional. Even if the district maintains the current plan and reinstitutes the racial tiebreaker, Seattle argues, Parents Involved members will only be affected if their children seek to enroll in a Seattle public high school and choose an oversubscribed school that is integration positivetoo speculative a harm to maintain standing. The fact that the controlling opinion would make a school districts use of such criteria often unlawful (and the pluralitys colorblind view would make such use always unlawful) suggests that todays opinion will require setting aside the laws of several States and many local communities. into account. Adarand, supra, at 228 (internal quotation marks omitted). In sum, the districts race-conscious plans satisfy strict scrutiny and are therefore lawful. See also Richmond v. J. Instead, what was upheld in Grutter was consideration of a far broader array of qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though important element. 539 U. S., at 325 (quoting Bakke, supra, The idea that if race is the problem, race is the instrument with which to solve it cannot be accepted as an analytical leap forward. 2d, at 842, based on the objective of achieving at all schools an African-American enrollment equivalent to the average district-wide African-American enrollment of 34 percent. 935, 937 (1989) (calling Brown the Supreme Courts greatest anti-discrimination decision); Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Brown, 347 U. S. 483; Dudziak, Brown as a Cold War Case, 91 J. One schoolGarfieldis more or less in the center of Seattle. Swann, evaluating a school district engaged in court-ordered desegregation, had no occasion to consider whether a districts voluntary adoption of race-based assignments in the absence of a finding of prior de jure segregation was constitutionally permissible, an issue that was again expressly reserved in Washington v. Seattle School Dist. See generally R. Sears, A Utopian Experiment in Kentucky: Integration and Social Equality at Berea, 18661904 (1996) (describing federal funding, through the Freedmans Bureau, of race-conscious school integration programs). See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. 244, 301 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peńa, 515 U. S. 200, 243 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 1(Parent Involved in Community Schools), limited the use of race in K-12 integration plans on Equal Protection grounds. The District asserts that it helped these schools by allowing students from the schools to attend other schools, furthering the goals of ending racial isolation and promoting equal access. The fact that it is possible that children of group members will not be denied admission to a school based on their racebecause they choose an undersubscribed school or an oversubscribed school in which their race is an advantagedoes not eliminate the injury claimed. The plan then drew new geographical school assignment zones designed to satisfy these guidelines; the district could reassign students if particular schools failed to meet the guidelines and was required to do so if a school repeatedly missed these targets. This is because "'racial classifications are simply too pernicious to permit any but the most exact connection between justification and classification.'" As for Louisville, its slate was cleared by the District Courts 2000 dissolution decree, which effectively declared that there were no longer any effects of de jure discrimination in need of remediation. 2, 4, 5 (WD Ky. 1999) (Hampton I). in No. In 1963, at the insistence of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and other community groups, the school board adopted a new race-based transfer policy. The segregationists also relied upon the likely practical consequences of ending the state-imposed system of racial separation. Of these, 209 were assigned to a school that was one of their choices, 87 of whom were assigned to the same school to which they would have been assigned without the racial tiebreaker. There is every reason to think that, if the dissents rationale were accepted, Congress, assuming an otherwise proper exercise of its spending authority or commerce power, could mandate either the Seattle or the Jefferson County plans nationwide. Public Schools, 330 F.Supp. See Swann, supra, at 2526; Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U. S. 70, 116 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). For example, where does the dissents principle stop? See Brief for Petitioner at 44. . Neither can assign to the other all responsibility for persisting injustices. See, e.g., id., at 111. Under Supreme Court jurisprudence, to prove there was no jurisdiction under Article III 2, the School District had to prove that they would not reinstate the policy. Although some parents or children prefer some schools over others, school popularity has varied significantly over the years. of Oral Arg. at 309a; School Board Report, School Choices and Assignments 20052006 School Year (Apr. During the period the tiebreaker applied, it typically affected about 300 students per year. [4] However, the Court struck down both school districts' assignment plans, finding that the plans were not sufficiently "narrowly tailored", a legal term that suggests that the means or method being employed (in this case, a student assignment plan based on individualized racial classifications) is closely and narrowly tied to the ends (the stated goals of achieving diversity and/or avoiding racial isolation). See Hallinan & Williams, Interracial Friendship Choices in Secondary Schools, 54 Am. Public Schools, 416 F.3d 513 (2005); Memorandum from Stephen W. Daeschner, Superintendent, to the Board of Education, Jefferson Cty. The memorandum of agreement between Seattle and OCR, of course, contains no admission by Seattle that such segregation ever existed or was ongoing at the time of the agreement, and simply reflects a desire to avoid the incovenience [sic] and expense of a formal OCR investigation, which OCR was obligated under law to initiate upon the filing of such a complaint. 17, 48 (1978). And in his critique of that analysis, I am in many respects in agreement with The Chief Justice. It also argues that the plan is not narrowly tailored because it does not seek integration at all racially imbalanced schools, only certain ones. Justice Breyers dissent also asserts that these cases are controlled by Grutter, claiming that the existence of a compelling interest in these cases follows a fortiori from Grutter, post, at 41, 6466, and accusing us of tacitly overruling that case, see post, at 6466. While extensive jurisprudence has developed over what is an actual case or controversy, in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife the Court specified three elements that must be satisfied: (1) a party must be facing an actual or imminent injury rather than a hypothetical injury (injury in fact); (2) the complained of conduct must have caused the alleged injury (causal connection); and (3) it must still be possible to provide some remedy to that injury by a favorable court decision. In over one-third of the assignments affected by the racial tiebreaker, then, the use of race in the end made no difference, and the district could identify only 52 students who were ultimately affected adversely by the racial tiebreaker in that it resulted in assignment to a school they had not listed as a preference and to which they would not otherwise have been assigned. After agreeing to hear an appeal (Parents Involved, 2006) in Parents Involved In Community Schools v. Seattle School District Number 1 (2007), a highly divided Supreme Court f 6 struck down plans from Seattle and Louisville that classified students by race in making school assignments. That view understands the basic objective of those who wrote the Equal Protection Clause as forbidding practices that lead to racial exclusion. From the standpoint of the victim, it is true, an injury stemming from racial prejudice can hurt as much when the demeaning treatment based on race identity stems from bias masked deep within the social order as when it is imposed by law. The plurality says that cases such as Swann and the others I have described all were decided before this Court definitively determined that all racial classifications . The idea that government racial classifications must be subjected to strict scrutiny did not originate in Adarand. One schoolGarfieldis more or less in the center of Seattle. For example, at Franklin High School in Seattle, the racial tiebreaker was applied because nonwhite enrollment exceeded 69 percent, and resulted in an incoming ninth-grade class in 20002001 that was 30.3 percent Asian-American, 21.9 percent African-American, 6.8 percent Latino, 0.5 percent Native-American, and 40.5 percent Caucasian. And it expanded the transfer opportunities available to elementary and middle school pupils. 1, a consolidated 2007 ruling that resolved both cases, the Court ultimately struck down the school plans at issue, holding that they violated the . See Brief for Petitioner at 4647. See post, at 6566. . So it was, as the dissent observes, see post, at 1314, that Louisville classified children by race in its school assignment and busing plan in the 1970s. Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle by Steve O'Brien See, e.g., Adarand, supra; Gratz, supra; Grutter, supra. In both cities, the school boards adopted plans designed to achieve integration by bringing about more racially diverse schools. area/siso/disprof/2005/DP05all.pdf; Brief for Respond- The dissent acknowledges that the two-sentence discussion in Swann was pure dicta, post, at 22, but nonetheless asserts that it demonstrates a basic principle of constitutional law that provides authoritative legal guidance. Post, at 22, 30. That necessary implication of the pluralitys position strikes the 13th chime of the clock. The reason is obvious: In Seattle, where the overall student population is 41% white, permitting 85% white enrollment at a single school would make it much more likely that other schools would have very few white students, whereas in Jefferson County, with a 60% white enrollment, one school with 85% white students would be less likely to skew enrollments elsewhere. Though this may oversimplify the matter a bit, one of the main concerns underlying those opinions was this: If it is legitimate for school authorities to work to avoid racial isolation in their schools, must they do so only by indirection and general policies? The last half-century has witnessed great strides toward racial equality, but we have not yet realized the promise of Brown. Does the Constitution mandate this inefficient result? We granted certiorari. The plan provoked considerable local opposition. Order No. Here again, though, the dissent overstates the data that supposedly support the interest. In making an assignment to a particular high school, the district would give first preference to a student with a sibling already at the school. The sample includes districts in urban areas of all sizes, suburbs (e.g., Arlington County, Virginia) and rural areas (e.g., Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, and Raleigh County, West Virginia). In fact, they are even more narrowly tailored than the Grutter plan, which withstood strict scrutiny. A federal District Court dismissed the suit, upholding the tiebreaker. 1, p.5 (The Fourteenth Amendment precludes a state from imposing distinctions or classifications based upon race and color alone);[Footnote 20] see also In Memoriam: Honorable Thurgood Marshall, Proceedings of the Bar and Officers of the Supreme Court of the United States, X (1993) (remarks of Judge Motley) (Marshall had a Bible to which he turned during his most depressed moments. Two of the plaintiffs in this case had children who were entering high school in the fall of 2000. of Oral Arg. App. On the other hand race-conscious measures that do not rely on differential treatment based on individual classifications present these problems to a lesser degree. Both parents appealed the Districts placement but were unable to have their children reassigned. See also Bakke, 438 U.S., at 312, 313, 98 S. Ct. 2733, 57 L. E. 2d 750 (opinion of Powell, J.).". For at least two reasons, however, it is wrong to place the remediation of segregation on the same plane as the remediation of racial imbalance. That determination typically will not be nearly as difficult as the dissent makes it seem. In design and operation, the plans are directed only to racial balance, an objective this Court has repeatedly condemned as illegitimate. [Footnote 2] In this and other ways, The Chief Justice rewrites the history of one of this Courts most important decisions. See Brief of the Asian American Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 5. 1, 458 U. S. 457, 460 (1982). Disappointed students are not rejected from a States flagship graduate program; they simply attend a different one of the districts many public schools, which in aspiration and in fact are substantially equal. 2d 1224 (2001); 426 F.3d 1162 (CA9 2005) (en banc) (Parents Involved VII).