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OWASP recommends DOMPurify for HTML Sanitization. It is almost impossible to detect DOM XSS only from the server-side (using HTTP requests). If you can, entirely avoid using user input, especially if it affects DOM elements such as the document.url, the document.location, or the document.referrer. The setAttribute(name_string,value_string) method is dangerous because it implicitly coerces the value_string into the DOM attribute datatype of name_string. Now, no matter how complex your web application is, the only thing that can introduce a DOM XSS vulnerability, is the code in one of your policies - and you can lock that down even more by limiting policy creation. You may want to do this to change a hyperlink, hide an element, add alt-text for an image, or change inline CSS styles. With Trusted Types enabled, the browser accepts a TrustedHTML object for sinks that expect HTML snippets. The general accepted practice is that encoding takes place at the point of output and encoded values should never be stored in a database. The example that follows illustrates using closures to avoid double JavaScript encoding. The best way to fix DOM based cross-site scripting is to use the right output method (sink). Read about other types of cross-site scripting attacks. Untrusted data is any data that may be controlled by an attacker, HTML form inputs, query strings, HTTP headers, even data sourced from a database as an attacker may be able to breach your database even if they cannot breach your application. It is also impossible to protect against such client-side attacks using WAFs. That said, developers need to be aware of problems that can occur when using frameworks insecurely such as: Understand how your framework prevents XSS and where it has gaps. The JavaScript or VBScript parser of an execution context is associated with the parsing and execution of script code. Cookie Attributes - These change how JavaScript and browsers can interact with cookies. Accelerate penetration testing - find more bugs, more quickly. This site is our home for content to help you on that journey, written by members of the Chrome team, and external experts. The third cross site scripting attack occurs entirely in the browser. On the client side, the HTTP response does not change but the script executes in malicious manner. As with all other Cross-site Scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities, this type of attack also relies on insecure handling of user input on an HTML page. jQuery used to be extremely popular, and a classic DOM XSS vulnerability was caused by websites using this selector in conjunction with the location.hash source for animations or auto-scrolling to a particular element on the page. To detect the possibility of a DOM XSS, you must simulate the attack from the client-side in the users browser using a web application scanner like Acunetix (with DOM-based XSS scanner functionality). It also enables you to easily search your data without having to encode values before searching and allows you to take advantage of any changes or bug fixes made to encoders. Start with using your frameworks default output encoding protection when you wish to display data as the user typed it in. A stored XSS attack enables an attacker to embed a malicious script into a vulnerable page, which is then executed when a victim views the page. To signify that the data was securely processed, create a special object - a Trusted Type.DoanElement.innerHTML = aTrustedHTML; With Trusted Types enabled, the browser accepts a TrustedHTML object for sinks that expect HTML snippets. For example: Modern web applications are typically built using a number of third-party libraries and frameworks, which often provide additional functions and capabilities for developers. A Computer Science portal for geeks. If you use the default encoders then any you applied to character ranges to be treated as safe won't take effect - the default encoders use the safest encoding rules possible. Using untrusted user data on the left side of the expression allows an attacker to subvert internal and external attributes of the window object, whereas using user input on the right side of the expression doesn't allow direct manipulation. The line above could have possibly worked to render a link. URL Contexts refer to variables placed into a URL. An attacker can construct a link to send a victim to a vulnerable page with a payload in the query string and fragment portions of the URL. View the source code of this file and note the following JavaScript code snippet: Essentially, the exploit uses the window.location.hash source, which is evaluated in an HTML element sink. For example, Acunetix. JavaScript Contexts refer to placing variables into inline JavaScript which is then embedded in an HTML document. In this case, AngularJS will execute JavaScript inside double curly braces that can occur directly in HTML or inside attributes. Putting dynamic data within JavaScript code is especially dangerous because JavaScript encoding has different semantics for JavaScript encoded data when compared to other encodings. To test for DOM-based cross-site scripting manually, you generally need to use a browser with developer tools, such as Chrome. It is particularly common when applications leverage common JavaScript function calls such as document.baseURI to build a part of the page without sanitization. Then the implicit eval of setTimeout reverses another layer of JavaScript encoding to pass the correct value to customFunction. Then client-side encode (using a JavaScript encoding library such as node-esapi) for the individual subcontext (DOM methods) which untrusted data is passed to. More recent versions of jQuery have patched this particular vulnerability by preventing you from injecting HTML into a selector when the input begins with a hash character (#). DOM-based Cross Site Scripting : DOM XSS stands for Document Object Model-based Cross-site Scripting. This will solve the problem, and it is the right way to re-mediate DOM based XSS vulnerabilities. Perhaps the non-conforming functionality is not needed anymore or can be rewritten in a modern way without using the error-prone functions?Don'tel.innerHTML = '<img src=xyz.jpg>'; Doel.textContent = '';const img = document.createElement('img');img.src = 'xyz.jpg';el.appendChild(img); Some libraries already generate Trusted Types that you can pass to the sink functions. If you sanitize content and then modify it afterwards, you can easily void your security efforts. A script within the later response contains a sink which then processes the data in an unsafe way. HTML Attribute Contexts refer to placing a variable in an HTML attribute value. Each encoder, Html, JavaScript and Url, must be configured separately. This could lead to an attack being added to a webpage.. for example. HTML Context refers to inserting a variable between two basic HTML tags like a
or . Consider adopting the following controls in addition to the above. Now only JavaScript encoding on server side. Also, XSS attacks always execute in the browser. We want to help you build beautiful, accessible, fast, and secure websites that work cross-browser, and for all of your users. Finally, to fix the problem in our initial code, instead of trying to encode the output correctly which is a hassle and can easily go wrong we would simply use element.textContent to write it in a content like this: It does the same thing but this time it is not vulnerable to DOM based cross-site scripting vulnerabilities. This is why you would need to HTML encode too. In the above example, untrusted data started in the rendering URL context (href attribute of an a tag) then changed to a JavaScript execution context (javascript: protocol handler) which passed the untrusted data to an execution URL subcontext (window.location of myFunction). Let's look at the sample page and script: Finally there is the problem that certain methods in JavaScript which are usually safe can be unsafe in certain contexts. Cross-site Scripting (XSS) can seriously threaten individual users and companies whose websites may be infected. Here is an example of the problem using map types: The developer writing the code above was trying to add additional keyed elements to the myMapType object. "\u0061\u006c\u0065\u0072\u0074\u0028\u0037\u0029". Encoding libraries often have a EncodeForJavaScript or similar to support this function. Its easy to make mistakes with the implementation so it should not be your primary defense mechanism. If that isn't enough to keep in mind, you have to remember that encodings are lost when you retrieve them using the value attribute of a DOM element. Sometimes it's not possible to remove the functionality, and there is no library to sanitize the value and create a Trusted Type for you. The following charts details a list of critical output encoding methods needed to stop Cross Site Scripting. Encoding at the point of output allows you to change the use of data, for example, from HTML to a query string value. DOM-based Cross-site Scripting (DOM XSS) is a particular type of a Cross-site Scripting vulnerability. Variables should only be placed in a CSS property value. How to find and test for XSS vulnerabilities You can use web vulnerability scanners to quickly find out XSS vulnerabilities. How to prevent DOM-based cross-site scripting? Output encoding here will prevent XSS, but it will break the intended functionality of the application. Download the latest version of Burp Suite. //The following DOES WORK because the encoded value is a valid variable name or function reference. There are three types of XSS attacks: stored, reflected and Document Object Model (DOM) based. It will not always prevent XSS. Instead you'll need to use the JavaScript debugger to determine whether and how your input is sent to a sink. For example: To make dynamic updates to HTML in the DOM safe, we recommend: The HTML attribute subcontext within the execution context is divergent from the standard encoding rules. We are looking for web developers to participate in user research, product testing, discussion groups and more. Types of XSS attacks since mid-2012: DOM-based XSS attacks in React. Your best bet is to use a vulnerability scanner with a DOM-based cross-site scripting detection module. DOM-based vulnerabilities occur in the content processing stage performed on the client, typically in client-side JavaScript. DOM-based cross-site scripting (DOM XSS) is a web vulnerability, a subtype of cross-site scripting. Note that the browser's "View source" option won't work for DOM XSS testing because it doesn't take account of changes that have been performed in the HTML by JavaScript. Some examples of DOM-based XSS attacks include: 1. Content Security Policy - An allowlist that prevents content being loaded. This view outputs the contents of the untrustedInput variable. Get the latest content on web security in your inbox each week. When URL encoding in DOM be aware of character set issues as the character set in JavaScript DOM is not clearly defined (Mike Samuel). Already got an account? Scale dynamic scanning. This can be done via a function such as: //The following does NOT work because the event handler is being set to a string. DOM-based cross-site scripting is a type of cross-site scripting (XSS) attack executed within the Document Object Model (DOM) of a page loaded into the browser. These types of attacks typically occur as a result . - owasp-CheatSheetSeries . Here are some examples of encoded values for specific characters. Sometimes you can't change the offending code. Read the entire Acunetix Web Application Vulnerability Report. For information on sources and sinks, read the following article: Finding the Source of a DOM-based XSS Vulnerability with Acunetix. Just using a string will fail, as the browser doesn't know if the data is trustworthy:Don'tanElement.innerHTML = location.href; With Trusted Types enabled, the browser throws a TypeError and prevents use of a DOM XSS sink with a string. This is in stark contrast to JavaScript encoding in the event handler attribute of a HTML tag (HTML parser) where JavaScript encoding mitigates against XSS. Please look at the OWASP Java Encoder JavaScript encoding examples for examples of proper JavaScript use that requires minimal encoding. If you have to use user input on your page, always use it in the text context, never as HTML tags or any other potential code. //The following does NOT work because of the encoded ";". Parsing HTML input is difficult, if not impossible. Output encoding is the primary defense against cross-site scripting vulnerabilities. The innerHTML sink doesn't accept script elements on any modern browser, nor will svg onload events fire. Ensuring that all variables go through validation and are then escaped or sanitized is known as perfect injection resistance. After encoding the encodedValue variable will contain %22Quoted%20Value%20with%20spaces%20and%20%26%22. Before putting untrusted data inside an HTML element ensure it's HTML encoded. The encoder safe lists can be customized to include Unicode ranges appropriate to the app during startup, in Program.cs: For example, using the default configuration using a Razor HtmlHelper similar to the following: The preceding markup is rendered with Chinese text encoded: To widen the characters treated as safe by the encoder, insert the following line into Program.cs. DOM-based Cross-site Scripting (DOM XSS) is a particular type of a Cross-site Scripting vulnerability. See what Acunetix Premium can do for you. There are other places in JavaScript where JavaScript encoding is accepted as valid executable code. \u0064\u006f\u0063\u0075\u006d\u0065\u006e\u0074, \u0077\u0072\u0069\u0074\u0065\u006c\u006e, "\u0048\u0065\u006c\u006c\u006f\u0020\u0057\u006f\u0072\u006c\u0064", "\u0061\u006c\u0065\u0072\u0074\u0028\u0031\u0031\u0029", "url(<%=ESAPI.encoder().encodeForJavascript(ESAPI.encoder().encodeForURL(companyName))%>)", '<%=ESAPI.encoder().encodeForJavascript(ESAPI.encoder().encodeForURL(userRelativePath))%>', "<%= Encode.forJavaScript(untrustedData) %>", "<%=ESAPI.encoder().encodeForJavascript(untrustedData)%>", "customFunction('<%=doubleJavaScriptEncodedData%>', y)", //HTML encoding is happening in JavaScript, "javascript:myFunction('<%=untrustedData%>', 'test');", "javascript:myFunction('<%=ESAPI.encoder().encodeForJavascript(ESAPI.encoder().encodeForURL(untrustedData)) %>', 'test');",